




IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTOMATION ASSISTANCE IN UNMANNED AERIAL 







John G. Blitch 
 





In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
 
For the Degree of Master of Science 
 
Colorado State University 
 








 Advisor:  Benjamin A. Clegg 
  
 Anne Cleary 










IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTOMATION ASSISTANCE IN UNMANNED AERIAL 
SYSTEM OPERATOR TRAINING 
 
The integration of automated modules into unmanned systems control has had a 
positive impact on operational effectiveness across a variety of challenging domains from 
battlefields and disaster areas to the National Airspace and distant planets. Despite the 
generally positive nature of such technological progress, however, concerns for 
complacency and other automation-induced detriments have been established in a 
growing body of empirical literature derived from both laboratory research and 
operational reviews. Given the military’s demand for new Unmanned Aerial System 
(UAS) operators, there is a need to explore how such concerns might extend from the 
operational realm of experienced professionals into the novice training environment.  
An experiment was conducted to investigate the influence of automation on 
training efficiency using a Predator UAS simulator developed by the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) in a modified replication of previous research. Participants were 
trained in a series of basic maneuvers, with half receiving automated support only on a 
subset of maneuvers. A subsequent novel landing test showed poorer performance for the 
group that received assistance from automation during training. Implications of these 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The ubiquitous arrival of computer based education in today’s society dictates a 
prominent role for automation in the development of future training programs. The bloom 
(if not explosion) of internet connectivity at the turn of the century has given rise to a 
new field of Instructional Systems Design (ISD) which presents the potential for 
enormous cost savings in the form of self paced and personally tailored training in both 
interactive and automation enhanced simulation environments (Paquette, 2001). The 
escalation of automation enhanced training is also of enormous interest to the U.S. 
military and other government agencies that have to come to appreciate the value of 
unmanned system technology for a broad range of surveillance and reconnaissance 
activities. The Army for example has fielded thousands of tactical robots with 
tremendous variability in capability and Operator Control Unit (OCU) design that calls 
for extensive training transfer across platforms (Antal, 2009). The Air Force is striving  to 
keep up with training demands for its most prominent Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), 
the Predator (Gramm & Papp, 2009). There is clearly a need to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency with which unmanned systems operators are trained – leaving the door 
wide open for automation to be considered as an enabling mechanism.  
 The operational need for autonomous activity has been well established across a 
number of application domains (Canning, 2008; Carey & Markoff, 2010; Kurzweil, 2005; 
Sheridan, 2000; Singer, 2009b). As humanity endeavors to explore distant planets like 
2 
 
Mars, for example, control of robots and supervision of humans from earth will suffer 
extensive communications delays which prohibit the direct tele-operation modes that are 
common in the remote control (RC) hobbyist and entertainment communities (Sheridan, 
1993; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). Human fatigue and attention constraints also present 
strong motivation for remote surveillance and reconnaissance by autonomous robots in 
the context of lunar and Martian exploration(Crawford & Weisbin, 2005).  
The case for automation in the application of mobile robot technology to the 
domestic emergency response domain is equally well established (Blitch & Maurer, 
1996). Not only does the supervision of multiple robots combing an large search area 
imply that enormous value be placed on autonomous waypoint following, but the chaotic 
distribution of rubble makes radio controlled robots inherently vulnerable to 
communication interruption and failure. Such situations dictate the need for autonomous 
route planning of some sort to reestablish contact with human supervisors in pursuit of 
basic system reliability (Baker, Casey, Keyes, & Yanco, 2004; Micire, Drury, Keyes, & 
Yanco, 2009) .   
Similar concerns regarding control loop latency and enemy jamming activities on 
the battlefield have inspired the military to develop unmanned systems with a high degree 
of autonomy (Antal, 2009; Hennigan, 2012; Singer, 2009a). The Army in particular has 
sought to invert the many-to-one ratio of unmanned systems currently operated by 
soldiers to a much more distributed paradigm where a single individual controls or 
supervises a number of platforms (Wickens, Dixon, & Ambinder, 2006). The U.S. Air 
Force apparently considers autonomous operation to be sufficiently important to the 
development of future battlefield robots that it will require full autonomous capability in 
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its unmanned aerial systems to be implemented by 2047 (USAF, 2009). Such trends 
imply that the military will become increasingly reliant on recruitment and training of 
new UAS operators. One indicator of this change in the nature of UAS training is that the 
USAF has accepted non-rated pilots into its operator training program for the first time 
since initially fielding the Predator drone in the mid 1990s (Gramm & Papp, 2009).  
 In this context, the exploration of potential training shortcuts and enhancements 
gained through automated assistance presents a number of prominent advantages. Not 
only does automation reduce the cost and personnel assignment load associated with a 
large unmanned system instructional faculty, but it may also increase the intensity and 
density of training as students are allowed to practice critical skills on their own without 
dependence on instructor schedules and related resource allocation limitations associated 
with maintenance and operational requirements imposed by operational aircraft. 
Improvement in the nature of the training itself may also be realized through the use of 
automation to reduce counterproductive frustration levels associated with complex 
training tasks by allowing students to focus on enabling skills first before introducing 
them to more challenging integration tasks.  
Operational automation concerns  
Despite the prominent trend toward increased dependence on autonomy for 
unmanned systems control, however, there are a number of issues that provide ample 
cause for concern. These are evident on both an empirical and theoretical basis, 
particularly in high risk domains such as aviation safety and process control reliability 
which of course has dangerous consequences of its own in the context of nuclear power 
generation and other risk intensive activities.   
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Automation induced complacency. 
Given recent events involving air traffic controllers who were fired for falling 
asleep on duty, perhaps the most salient concern at hand is the apparent complacency 
induced by automated systems which performed malfunction monitoring tasks too well. 
In two flight simulator experiments, for example, humans who were assisted with 
consistent malfunction alerts performed their overall vigilance tasks with significantly 
more error than those assisted with occasionally inconsistent reliability (Parasuraman, 
Molloy, & Singh, 1993). The apparent “cry wolf” nature of this effect has been replicated 
across a number of related tasks, indicating a robust yet deleterious impact that the 
aviation community in particular remains concerned about (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2008; Wickens, 2009) in the form of increased safety violations and accidents 
due to ignored alarms.  
Situational awareness loss – the “human out of the loop” problem. 
Even in training situations where humans do not appear to commit an excessive 
number of errors during learning, any decrement in comprehensive understanding of 
current conditions and trends affecting the future (typically referred to as Situational 
Awareness or SA) cast in the shadow of automated assistance can have a potentially 
catastrophic impact on performance – particularly during emergency response activities 
that must be taken promptly and aggressively to prevent disasters (Endsley, 1997). In a 
sequence of prominent simulation studies validated with actual air traffic controllers on 
duty, Endsley and colleagues established a compelling case for the “human out of the 
loop” effect in which humans who have lost SA due to a reliance on automation may 
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experience increased latencies in both problem detection & response (Endsley, 1997; 
Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber, Onal, & Endsley, 1999; Kaber, Onal, & Endsley, 2000).  
Because this loss of awareness does not always manifest in an immediate 
degradation of current performance, it can act as a kind of ticking time bomb which 
percolates just beneath a façade of safe operation, only to impede rapid response and 
resilience in the face of catastrophic consequences that might otherwise be avoided. In 
the most drastic cases, the response to urgent or dangerous situations is delayed or 
perhaps even obstructed until it is too late to avoid a crash or other disastrous situation 
(Endsley, 1997; Endsley & Kaber, 1999).  For additional reviews regarding other forms 
of automation induced complacency see (Lee, 2006; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; 
Sheridan, 1997; Wickens & Colcombe, 2007). 
 Automation influence on training. 
Despite the abundance of empirical evidence regarding the potential for negative 
consequences of operational autonomy (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Bainbridge, 1983; 
Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber, et al., 2000; Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997; Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008; Smith, 2011), few have dealt with the 
autonomy decrement issue from a learning perspective other than through explorations of 
trust (Lee & Moray, 1992; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007; Sheridan & Parasuraman, 
2000; Wickens, et al., 2006). Automation taxonomies emerging from a growing body of 
empirical evidence have established various Levels of Automation (LOA) following 
distinctions between failure detection (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2000), functionality 
(Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008), and comprehensive perspectives which span the gamut 
of human machine interaction paradigms (Endsley & Kaber, 1999). 
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 Since many of these studies have been conducted in professional environments 
involving air/ground traffic management and other high risk mission sets that preclude 
novice control due to safety concerns, the taxonomies on which they are based involve 
generally proceed on the important assumption that the humans involved have reached an 
appreciable degree of competence in the tasks at hand before automation is introduced. 
Although there is peripheral consideration given to autonomy influence on skill 
maintenance and refresher training, particularly in the closing years of the 20th century 
(Bainbridge, 1983; Moray, 1986; Parasuraman, Mouloua, & Molloy, 1996; Wiener, 
1988), less consideration has been given to the impact of automation on the acquisition of 
skill itself.  
It is with this relative paucity of literature dealing with the impact of automation 
on training that Clegg and colleagues launched their research into the influence of 
automation in the context of process control (Clegg, B.A., Heggestad, E.D., & Blalock, 
L.D., 2010). This effort explored the nature of autonomous assistance provided to novice 
operators who were trying to learn how to efficiently manage a moderately complex 
control process involved in the pasteurization of orange juice. Performance was measured 
on how much juice was successfully pasteurized in a given amount of time under full 
manual control and different levels of autonomous assistance made available under 
various conditions.  
The results of this first experiment indicated an initial advantage presented by 
assistive autonomy. As training progressed and operators attained higher levels of 
proficiency, however, this advantage diminished to an insignificant level. A second 
objective of the study endeavored to explore any potential dependence that trainees might 
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develop for the automation assistance. Removing automation during the final test phase 
impacted performance but only in the case where automation was automatically 
introduced during training.  
By gradually decreasing the level of autonomy during training and randomly 
varying the specific control inputs managed by automation, a second experiment in this 
study sought to examine potential mitigation strategies which might be used to protect 
against autonomy induced learning decrements or perhaps even reverse them. The data, 
however, failed to support either approach. Not only was a performance decrement 
observed when the specific juice pasteurization subtasks were switched between manual 
and autonomous control on a random basis, but the automation removal effect persisted 
even when autonomy was gradually reduced over the course of instruction (Clegg & 
Heggestad, 2010).  
By comparison, manual control performance during this study presented the 
strongest learning efficiency curve of all (on a performance increase over time basis), 
suggesting that while autonomy may present an initial advantage by projecting superior 
performance at the start of training (which may actually be quite important for novice 
trainee motivation levels), it appears to have a detrimental impact on training efficiency 
overall. While this might seem to be obvious in 20/20 hindsight and applied autonomy 
literature, the result at the time seemed quite counterintuitive from the perspective of 
novice trainees who appear to be overwhelmed by complex training tasks and might thus 
be expected to seek assistance from automated modules.  
Maintaining a desirable level of difficulty in training has often been shown to 
keep such overconfidence tendencies in check while requiring a increased depth of 
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processing (Bjork & Allen, 1970; Haider & Frensch, 2002; Healy et al., 2002; Healy et 
al., 2005) . Although increased difficulty does not always result in superior performance 
during learning (it often does quite the opposite), it has been shown time and again to 
enhance long term retention of acquired skill – which arguably constitutes the paramount 
goal of training in the first place (Bjork, 1994; Bjork & Bjork, 2006; Healy, Wohldmann, 
& Bourne, 2005).  
Additional support for this notion can be found in the metacognition literature via 
the so called “testing effect” that shows time and again how simply reviewing 
information in a self study mode has been shown to be far inferior to testing one’s 
knowledge in a more effortful yet fruitful (from a retention standpoint) retrieval paradigm 
(Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Kornell & Bjork, 2008). This begs the question as to 
whether autonomy may actually be helping too much in reducing the training task below 
a desirable level of difficulty that is necessary to form a comprehensive mental model of 
the task to be performed (Norman, D., 1990). Employees who have learned to rely on 
incomplete or inaccurate mental models developed during training may perform 
inadequately when it comes to overriding errant process control procedures – often with a 
disastrous consequence. Unfortunately, the impact of such a training deficit is destined to 
increase as the demand for innovative human problem solving is required at higher levels 
of complexity – a situation that has often been referred to “the irony of 
automation”(Bainbridge, 1983).  
Despite these findings, it remains unclear what portion (if any) of automation 
influence on training observed in the process control regime would transfer into 
unmanned systems operator training. The taxonomy discussion put forth by Moray & 
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Inagaki suggests that these two task domains be considered differently (Moray & Inagaki, 
1999). Observations of participants learning air combat management tasks during the 
advent of computer enhanced cockpits also suggest that these two task domains be 
considered differently. Ballas and colleagues observed that participants in a flight 
simulator performed combat management (a rough analog to what is considered “process 
control”) tasks differently (i.e. with occasionally better performance via text selection) 
during flight operations than tactical maneuvers performed via direct manipulation of an 
aircraft’s control surfaces via joystick (Ballas, Heitmeyer, & Pérez-Quiñones, 1992). 
 The goal of the experiment that follows was to replicate the automation effects 
observed by Clegg and colleagues (Clegg, Benjamin A., Heggestad, Eric D., & Blalock, 
Lisa Durrance, 2010) in the context of unmanned systems control. Although this previous 
work established automation induced decrements in the training regime, it remains 
unclear whether those effects were specific to the process control domain or not. If the 
distinction between manual dexterity and cognitive skill that Bainbridge notes in 
describing process control oscillation can be mapped to the tactical cockpit as Ballas and 
colleagues suggest, then the manner and intensity with which automation influences these 
two different skill sets may vary accordingly (Bainbridge, 1983; Ballas, et al., 1992).  
In any case, the intent here is not only to examine the consistency of the 
automation withdrawal effect in a context with relevance to unmanned systems operating 
in a military setting, but to do so in a domain that is exciting and challenging enough to 
avoid the potential apathy and boredom induced by a typical keyboard/mouse input 
paradigm (Gee, 2003). By adding a complex motor control challenge applied to an 
unfamiliar (and notoriously difficult) aircraft flight task, participants were expected to 
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welcome assistance from the autopilot much more warmly than a vigilance dominated 
process control task.  
Since this flight simulator emulated some of the typical video games in today’s 
entertainment market, this experimental design endeavored to minimize the role that 
motivation plays in training as explored in previous research (Barab et al., 2009). 
Because the gaming paradigm presents a more entertaining task set than the 
pasteurization process, a relatively constant level of engagement was anticipated across 
the autonomy and manual groups and thereby emphasizing a task difficulty manipulation 
while holding motivation relatively constant in deference to previous research 
(Broadhurst, 1959).  
Another factor leading to the current design was the intent to invoke a 
standardized comprehensive task training procedure in lieu of the trial and error style of 
learning used by Clegg et al (2010). This more structured approach was expected to avoid 
inconsistent oscillations from extraneous factors occasionally observed in the trial and 
error process which might otherwise have allowed automation to fundamentally shift the 
level of task understanding being developed for the entire system. The standardized 
process, by comparison, was expected to limit the impact of automation to only influence 
the experiential portion of learning rather than all possible aspects of the trial and error 
process.  
The design used here also included more a common experience between the two 
control groups since automation was only introduced in a middle training block 
sandwiched between two manual control blocks. By starting and ending with a common 
training mode, any negative consequence of automation withdrawal (such as motivation 
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or attentional anomalies) that did not have direct learning implications for the task at 
hand were reduced. This consistency factor is of particular importance in considering that 
the final test, landing the aircraft, represented a culminating yet novel challenge which 
required trainees to integrate the skills they learned during the three component sub tasks 
in a new way.  
This approach allowed us to examine how automation influenced the trainees’ 
understanding of the underlying principles of unmanned systems control rather than just 
the physical relationships associated with routine flight characteristics. In combat 
environments where anomalous activity and situational dynamics demand that emergency 
procedures be invoked well beyond what routine relationships might otherwise handle, a 
comprehensive understanding of the entire systems control realm is crucial to successful 
recovery from otherwise disastrous circumstances whether they are induced and/or 
exacerbated by automation, enemy activity, or any number of other factor combinations.  
By utilizing the U.S. Air Force simulation based training paradigm for novice 
Predator operators, these issues were addressed enroute to the primary objective of the 
research – to examine the hypothesis that automation induced deficits previously 
observed in the process control regime extend into the realm of unmanned systems 
control, and thereby warrant research and development of mitigating strategies to counter 
their negative influence.  
CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 
The following study was conducted in order to assess the potential for autonomy 
assisted training to increase or decrease the learning efficiency of novice trainees 
struggling to learn a highly complex task in a militarily relevant domain. The primary 
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goal was to test the autonomy removal hypothesis that predicts a drop in overall 
performance when trainees who have used assistive autonomy are subsequently required 
to perform a complex task without it. By requiring one group to train manually while 
providing another group access to assistive autonomy (in the form of a selective auto-
pilot function in Predator UAS simulator) during the middle of three training blocks, the 
current experiment aspired to compare performance levels in a manner similar to the 
orange juice process pasteurizer process used by Clegg et al. (20102), but in a more 




20 Colorado State University (CSU) undergraduates participated in this study for 
optional, partial, or introductory psychology course credit. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two groups: one requiring manual control during the entire training 
and test process, and another that was provided with autonomy assistance during one 
phase of their training.  
Materials  
This experiment was conducted using the Predator STE (Synthetic Training 
Environment) simulation software provided by the Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL) installed on a Dell Pentium 4 desktop computer with a Hands On Throttle And 
Stick (HOTAS) joystick assembly and secondary monitor (USAF/AFRL, 2002). Input 
stimuli of interest were provided by the Predator STE simulator as described by Martin 
and colleagues in their report on development of synthetic task for human factors 
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development (Martin, Lyon, Schreiber, & Martin, 1998).  A pictorial representation of 
this basic setup is included in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Predator Synthetic Training Environment (STE) basic setup 
Procedures 
This experiment used a between subjects design with a manual (M) group and 
autonomy assisted (AA) group. Participation in this experiment was conducted in four 
sessions each lasting approximately one hour in duration. Prior to initiating hands on 
training blocks, participants were asked to review a 25 minute tutorial on the Basic 
Maneuver (BM) characteristics of the Predator UAS. This tutorial was comprised of a 
typical slide show type presentation with animated video clips to provide moving 




The first hands on training block (TB1) commenced with the participant reading 
over a one page scenario description of the STE’s basic maneuver scenario one. This TB1 
task required them to reduce airspeed from 67 knots down to 62 knots while holding 
heading and altitude constant. The participant was given five minutes to read the page 
and ask for clarifications.  
The participant then performed 20 training trials on TB1, each lasting one minute 
in length. Performance for each trial was automatically recorded and displayed for the 
participant at the end of each trial in the form of their Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
compared to optimal flight control inputs as indicated by the feedback panel in Figure 2. 
Participants were typically required to take a brief (approximately one minute) break after 
every 5 trials in order to mitigate fatigue effects. This break was also used as an 
opportunity for experimenters to check data recordings for consistency and accuracy.   
In order to avoid instructional bias, experimenters offered no coaching or advice 
of any sort. Questions from participants regarding functionality of any sort were 
answered with an offer to conduct a brief review the previously shown tutorial as a 
refresher. Subsequent questions following that procedure were simply answered with 
“please just do the best you can.”  Sessions were scheduled on four consecutive days 
starting on Monday and ending on Thursday whenever possible to maintain a 
standardized training profile. This process also ensured a consistent opportunity for sleep 
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enhanced memory consolidation between training blocks. 
 
Figure 2.  Example of performance feedback during Basic Maneuver training   
Training block 2 (TB2) began by having participants read a single page 
description of the Predator STE’s basic maneuver scenario two. This TB2 task required 
participants to execute a 180 degree turn while holding altitude and airspeed constant. 
Participants who had been randomly assigned to the manual group were provided with 
scenario description TB2M (for Manual control) which contained standard instructions 
for maintaining altitude and airspeed during the turn. Those who had been randomly 
assigned to the autonomy group were provided with the scenario description of TB2A 
(for Automation assistance) which explains that both the throttle and pitch inputs during 
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this turning scenario would be handled by the aircraft’s autopilot. Thus the sole manual 
input for the automation assisted group was along the roll axis, controlled via the 
joystick. These participants were therefore instructed to ignore the performance feedback 
for altitude and airspeed and focus on heading instead. Participants were once again 
allowed a brief stretch break after every five of their twenty trials.  
At the beginning of Training block 3 (TB3) participants were provided with a one 
page description for the STE’s  basic maneuver scenario five which requires a straight 
line descent (reduction of airspeed and altitude while holding heading constant) under full 
manual control.1 The final test was focused exclusively on a descent to land paradigm 
and involved no climbing activity of any sort.  
 The final session of the experiment constituted the test block and began with each 
participant completing the Predator STE’s Landing Task (LT) tutorial in the same fashion 
as the basic maneuver tutorial. Once the LT tutorial was been completed, each participant 
was provided with a single page scenario description for the Land Task Test (LTT) which 
required them to perform two 90 degree descending turns while on approach to the 
runway, and then land the aircraft.  They performed this task five times, and reviewed 
their performance data after each trial with the feedback indicated in Figure 3.  
LTT trials typically lasted from three to four minutes depending on the approach 
and landing path taken. After all five landing trials were completed the participant was 
asked to fill out a short (five minute) spatial experience survey which allowed 






experience or other exceptional experience that might result in anomalous training 
effects. This survey verified the novice status of all participants in the study.   
 
Figure 3.  Example of performance feedback during the Landing Task Test    
Measures  
The Predator STE simulator records individual performance for every trial.  In 
this experiment, the data collected during basic maneuver sessions was considered to be 
training, while landing task records were considered to be test data. 
Performance metrics during training. 
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The Predator STE simulator recorded performance during training in the form of 
error metrics which represented the aircraft’s response to the primary control inputs that 
are required for an operator to successfully maneuver and ultimately land the Predator 
aircraft. These automatically calculated by the simulator’s path projection modules in a 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) fashion captured in the 3 following metrics:  
Altitude error was measured as a y axis vertical displacement from the optimal 
path that a trainee should have taken on each trial as indicated by instructions given at the 
introduction for each task. In the first basic maneuver task (TB1), for example, the trainee 
was required to reduce airspeed while holding altitude constant at 15,000 feet. Altitude 
error during this task was measured as the absolute value above or below 15,000 that the 
trainee allowed the aircraft to climb or descend over the course of each trial.   
Heading error was measured as a bearing difference in degrees measured from 
the optimal direction that a trainee should have maintained in relation to the path 
specified in each task scenario. In the second basic maneuver task (TB2), for example, 
the trainee was required to execute a smooth 180 degree turn at an optimal rate of three 
degrees per second.  Heading error during this task was measured in degrees from the 
dynamically adjusted direction required to maintain a smooth 180 degree arc over course 
of each trial.  
Airspeed error was measured as the difference from the optimal Indicated Air 
Speed (IAS) required to accomplish the task at hand. During TB2, for example, the 
trainee is required to perform a 180 degree turn while maintaining airspeed at constant of 
62 knots.  Indicated Air Speed (IAS) error during this task was measured as the 
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difference above or below that constant airspeed of 62 knots that the trainee allowed the 
aircraft to achieve during each trial.  
Criterion Pass/Fail: In addition to the error metrics listed above, the number of 
times a participant reached a criterion performance level (automatically established by 
the simulator and indicated to the trainee during post trial feedback) was also recorded as 
an indicator of how much learning was accomplished by each participant.   
Although these error measures are related to the ground track and glide slope 
metrics later considered under the general rubric of the Landing Task Test, they do not 
constitute a direct mapping to landing proficiency or even control inputs themselves. In 
many cases, the specific error they endeavor to capture reflects a summation of multiple 
control inputs. Failure to maintain a specified altitude, for example, can result from 
having the aircraft pitched up or down too much through overly aggressive manipulation 
of the joystick and/or simultaneously applying too much or too little throttle input to the 
engine - perhaps while struggling to maintain the appropriate bank angle required to 
execute a smooth turn.  
Maintaining a proper balance between the three primary control inputs: pitch, roll, 
and throttle (yaw/rudder control was fully automated by the simulator’s default settings), 
represents the essence of the control challenge for those learning to land the aircraft.  If 
the trainee was able to maintain a balance of control inputs which kept the aircraft within 
an acceptable performance criterion envelope for each metric during an entire trial, then 
simulator would automatically record a “pass” rating for that particular task/scenario 
(TB1 for example) and the participant would be started on the next successive 
task/scenario (TB2).  
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In order to ensure that trial by trial training time for each participant was held 
constant, trainees were restarted on the same scenario for all 20 trials regardless of 
whether or not they passed criterion on that particular run. Thus all participants 
completed all 20 trials of each training block regardless of the level of competence they 
ultimately attained.  
Performance metrics at test.  
Final performance in this experiment was automatically calculated by the 
simulator in the RMSE fashion indicated above and captured in 3 separate metrics as 
described below:  
Approach Ground Track error was measured as an x/y horizontal displacement 
from the optimal approach path that a pilot candidate should have pursued in relation to 
various terrain features in the vicinity of the airport while turning the aircraft through 
three waypoints enroute to their final landing activity. 
Final Ground Track error was measured as an x/y horizontal displacement from 
the optimal approach path that a trainee should have taken in relation to the runway once 
they had made their final turn toward the airport and were on the final leg of their 
landing.  
Glide Slope error was measured as a +/- vertical displacement along the z axis of 
an optimal descent slope that the trainee should have pursued through each LTT trial 
from start to finish (touchdown). 
Criterion Pass/Fail: In addition to the error metrics listed above, the number of 
times a participant reached criterion was also recorded as an indicator of how much 
learning was accomplished by each participant. This is the only performance metric that 
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was common to both the basic maneuver training phase and the landing task test phase, 




CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 
Performance results at test  
In order to answer our research question regarding the influence of automation on 
learning, performance on the Landing Task Test (LTT) was initially investigated as the 
primary indicator of training efficiency since hands on duration, or “stick time” was held 
constant for all participants. This analysis was focused on mean performance measured 
across the three primary landing task metrics indicated above. 
In order to explore test performance beyond the potential influence of first trial 
nervousness, a value of average error across all five trials was compiled for each test 
metric and subjected to an independent samples t-test. This resulted in a statistically 
significant difference in glide slope error indicating that the Automation Assisted (AA) 
group (M=186, SD=60) performed worse that the Manual (M) group (M=124, SD=65) in 
handling altitude and airspeed while landing the aircraft t(18)= 2.24, p<.05. These data 
presented a relatively large effect size (Cohen’s d =0.91) as depicted in Figure 4.  
No group difference was found in the Approach Ground Track metric (AA group 
M=123, SD=59, M group M=103, SD=34), t(18)= 0.92, p>.05, nor the Final Ground 
Track metric (AA group M=100, SD=65, M group M=85, SD=67),t(18)= 0.51, p>.05). 
But importantly, neither showed a trend towards an advantage of automation in training – 
suggesting that no benefits were derived from allowing the AA group to focus on only 




Figure 4. Average performance across all five Landing Task Test trials for groups 
that were previously assisted with automation or trained solely with manual control 
After this initial difference in average Glide slope error was found, an inspection 
of means from the first Landing Task Test (LTT) trial was conducted, showing that while 
a moderately larger amount of error appeared in the data graphs for the Automation 
Assisted (AA) group (M=283, SD=142) compared with the Manual (M) group (M=195, 
SD 101) in Figure 5, this trend failed to reach statistical significance t(18)= 1.59, p>.05., 
Cohen’s d =0.69.        
No significant difference in first LTT trial error was found in the Approach 
Ground Track metric (AA group M=138, SD=125, M group M=160, SD=128), t(18)= 
0.39, p>.05, nor the Final Ground Track metric (AA group M=146, SD=214, M group 




Figure 5. Average performance results from Landing Task Test across all 5 trials  
An identical analysis of the data collected on the last LTT trial failed to show a 
statistically significant difference between groups (t(18)= 0.63, p>.05, Cohen’s d=0.28) 
suggesting that the AA group (M=132, SD=64) was able to reduce their relative deficit in 
Glide Slope control during landing compared to the manual group (M=111, SD=80) as 
indicated in Figure 6. No difference in last LTT trial error was found in the Approach 
Ground Track metric (AA group M=89, SD=41, M group M=78, SD=43), t(18)= 0.58, 
p>.05, nor the Final Ground Track metric (AA group M=71, SD=75, M group M=74, 




Figure 6. Performance results from final Landing Task Test trial 
In order examine the notion that the AA group might have been able to recover 
from their initial performance deficit at the start of the Landing Task Test, a repeated 
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted across all five landing attempts 
on trial by trial basis.   
Analysis of the Glide slope data was found to violate Maunchly’s test for 
sphericity (Χ2(9) = 25.727, p<.05), so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є = .720) was 
used.  After this correction was made, a main effect for trial (F(2.882, 4)= 4.428, p<.05, 
ηp= 0.174),  showed that performance was changing across LTT trials. A significant test 
of linear contrast (F(1)=10.888, p<.05, ηp= 0.341), indicated that performance showed 
consistent changes across trials. A main effect for group was also found (F(2)=5.054, 
p<.05, ηp= 0.325) but there was no evidence of an interaction of group with trial 
(F(5.764, 8)= 0.438, p>.05) as portrayed in figure 7.  
Taken together, these analyses indicate that although both sets of participants 
were able to steadily reduce their error over time, the automation assisted group 
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consistently performed worse in controlling glide slope during landing than the manual 
group. While a comparison of effect size suggests that the automation assisted group was 
able to reduce the relative impact of their glide slope control deficit over time, the lack of 
an interaction between group and trial discourages any claim of slope convergence that 
might otherwise suggest that the AA group was essentially able to catch up to the M 
group due to continued learning during the test phase. Further examination of this 
convergence potential is left as motivation for future research.  
 
Figure 7.  Trial by trial Glide slope error for Landing Task Test  
 Approach Ground Track data was also found to violate Maunchly’s test for 
sphericity (Χ2(9) = 35.13, p<.05), so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є = .504) was 
again used to correct degrees of freedom.  After this correction was made, a main effect 
for trial (F(2.014, 4)= 4.153, p<.05, ηp= 0.165) showed that performance was changing 
across LTT trials. A significant test of linear contrast (F(1)=7.218, p<.05, ηp= 0.189), 
again indicated that performance showed consistent changes over the course of the test 
block. No main effect was found for group in the Approach Ground Track metric, 
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however (F(2)= 2.454, p>.05, ηp= 0.189), nor was there any interaction observed between 
trial and group (F(4.028, 8)= 0.814, p>.05, ηp= 0.072). This analysis suggests that both 
groups managed to decrease their Approach Ground Track error steadily with each 
additional trial as indicated in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Trial by trial Approach Ground Track error for Landing Task Test 
Final Ground Track error was analyzed in an identical manner to the other 
performance metrics above. Mauchly’s test for sphericity was again violated (Χ2(9) = 
53.37, p<.05), so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є = .459) was again used to correct 
degrees of freedom.  After this correction was made, no main effect was observed for 
trial (F(1.837, 4)= 1.513, p>.05, ηp= 0.067) or group (F(2)= 0.884, p>.05, ηp= 0.078), nor 
was there any evidence of an interaction between the two (F(3.674, 8)= 0.870, p>.05, ηp= 
0.077) as illustrated in figure 9. This data presents no evidence that learning occurred on 
this control variable across these particular trials, perhaps due to a floor/ceiling effect or 




Figure 9.  Trial by trial Final Ground Track error for Landing Task Test  
It should be noted here that no participant ever reached criterion on the Landing 
Task Test. Not only does this show how difficult the Predator aircraft is to land 
effectively, but it also indicates how early these trainees are being assessed in what might 
otherwise be a professionally mandated training cycle. Exploration of extended training 
efforts that might allow participants to reach landing task criterion remains an issue to 
address with future research.  
Performance results during training   
While the skills transfer test from basic maneuvering to landing offer the best 
examination of the hypotheses at hand, questions remain about the impact that 
automation had on the nature of skill acquisition itself. In order to comprehensively 
assess the impact of automation on training, it makes sense to expand analysis beyond 
test data and examine whatever learning indicators might exist within the training data 
itself. With this objective in mind, a secondary analysis was launched which sought to 
take advantage of the automatic error recording features available in the Predator STE 
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simulator. This analysis followed the same general rubric as the test analysis, but with a 
more direct focus on control inputs indicated by the training performance metrics: 
altitude, heading and airspeed error. The number of times each participant was able to 
meet criterion was also considered on a pass/fail basis over the total of 20 trials per 
training block.   
 
Figure 10. Average error summary for Training Block 1 
Although the functional distinction between the Automation Assisted (AA) group 
and the odd numbered Manual (M) group was not made until the autopilot function was 
actually introduced during training block 2 (TB2), data from training block 1 (TB1) was 
still evaluated to determine whether or not the assumption of randomly assigned 
participants (via even and odd numbered enrollment numbers respectively) was valid. As 
expected, a series of independent sample t-tests conducted on average error data from 
TB1 revealed no significant difference between groups in altitude error AA (M=66, 
SD=38), Manual (M=48, SD=25), t(18)=1.26, p>.05, airspeed error AA(M=4.0, SD=1.5), 
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M(M=2.8, SD=1.2), t(18)=1.86, p>.05, or heading error AA(M=0.34, SD=0.80), 
M(M=0.52, SD=0.80), t(18)=0.52, p>.05 as indicated in Figure 10.  
The data for criterion achieved during TB1 failed Levene’s test for equality of 
variances. After a correction to the degrees of freedom was made, the two tailed 
independent samples t-test (t(11.2, 18)=2.15, p>.05) revealed no difference in pass/fail 
criteria between the Automation Assisted group (M=1.3, SD=2.2) and the Manual group 
(M=5.7, SD 6.1) also indicated in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 11. Trial by trial altitude error during Training Block 1 
Following the precedent set on above for the landing task, a trial by trial analysis 
for TB1 was conducted via repeated measures ANOVA for each of the training error 
metrics. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was consistently violated during this analysis, so a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied throughout. A main effect and linear fit for 
TB1 trials was found for altitude (Є = .293), (F(5.570, 19)= 3.836, p<.05, ηp= 0.176), 
(F(1)=10.659, p<.05, ηp= 0.372) and airspeed, (Є = .201), (F(3.816, 19)= 6.816, p<.05, 
ηp= 0.275), (F(1)=12.432, p<.05, ηp= 0.409) indicating that accumulated error was 
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changing significantly and consistently during training on these two metrics, but not for 
heading (Є = .122), (F(2.318, 19)= 0.857, p>.05) as portrayed in Figures 11-13. These 
data suggest that participants were learning how to reduce their control error in altitude 
and airspeed but not heading, which is consistent with the apparent objective of this 
particular training block.  
 
Figure 12. Trial by trial airspeed error during Training Block 1 
Given the TB1 scenario requirement to hold heading and altitude constant while 
reducing airspeed, these data make sense because the amount of heading error incurred 
via side pressure on the stick while participants endeavored to compensate for slower 
speed with increased pitch was negligible. There was, in essence, no significant source of 





Figure 13. Trial by trial heading error during Training Block 1 
Importantly, there was no main effect for group or interaction between trial and 
group evident during TB1 for altitude F(1)= 1.714, p>.05), (Є = .293), (F(5.570, 19)= 
0.755, p>.05, airspeed F(1)= 3.328, p>.05), (Є = .201), (F(3.816, 19)=1.796, p>.05) or 
heading F(1)= 0.449, p>.05), (Є = .122), (F(2.318, 19)= 1.203, p>.05), which suggests 
that all participants started out with equivalent performance before automation was 
introduced.  
When considered collectively, these data illustrate that both groups of participants 
were able to steadily decrease their altitude and airspeed error in a linear fashion over the 
20 trials in the first training block, which suggests that an appreciable amount of learning 
took place without any significant difference between groups. This notion was further 
supported by the average number of times (M=3.50, SD=4.99) that all participants were 
able to reach criterion in TB1 no matter which group they were assigned to.   
An analysis of training performance during the second training block (TB2) could 
only be compared via the heading error metric since airspeed and altitude were controlled 
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by the autopilot for half of the participants. No difference was found between groups in a 
t-test comparison of average heading error AA(M=29.5, SD=14.6), M(M=24.8, 
SD=12.7), t(18)=0.769, p>.05, as illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Average heading error during Training Block 2 
 Although participants under full manual control were able to achieve criterion on 
an average of 1.1 of their 20 trials in TB2, it would be inappropriate compare that number 
against a zero value for the AA group since the imperfect nature of the STE autopilot 
prevented participants receiving automation assistance from reaching criterion on any 
trial. 
A sequential analysis of TB2 heading data revealed a main effect for trial 
(F(5.409, 19)=11.979, p<.05, ηp=0.400, with a significant linear contrast F(1)=39.178, 
p<.05, ηp=0.685 after a Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є = .285) for sphericity violation 
was applied. There was no main effect found for group F(1)=0.591, p>.05, and no 




Figure 15. Trial by trial heading error during Training Block 2 
 These data were surprising in several respects. While the linear reduction of error 
during TB2 was generally expected commensurate with the power law of practice 
(Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), the lack of a significant error difference between groups  
was not. Given that two of the three control inputs required during the TB2 turning task 
were handled by the autopilot for the participants in the AA group, it was expected that 
the M group would incur far more heading error since they had to augment their efforts to 
control the aircraft’s roll axis with management of throttle and pitch input as well. These 
data failed to meet that expectation. The one to three control input ratio was also expected 
to result in a steeper learning slope for the M group, which also failed to occur as 
indicated by the lack of any group-trial interaction (F(5.409, 19)=1.083, p>.05, and the 
nearly equivalent linear fit slopes indicated in figure 15. Not only do these data support 
an observed trend towards better learning without automation, but the meager effect size 
associated with them suggest that an increased sample size would have little influence on 
the results.  
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Since the basic maneuver scenario for the final training block (TB3) required both 
groups to execute a descent in full manual mode without turning, all three performance 
metrics were again evaluated. Although removal of any turning requirement supported 
the assumption that heading change would be of negligible impact during this task 
AA(M=0.336, SD=0.797), M(M=0.521, SD=0.802),t(18)=0.516, p>.05, it was expected 
that the removal of autonomy from the AA group would result in a significant difference 
in performance across all of the dependent variables in a manner similar to that observed 
by Clegg & colleagues (Clegg, B.A., et al., 2010). No difference  between groups was 
observed, however, in the number of trials meeting criterion AA(M=1.30, SD=2.163), 
M(M=5.70, SD=6.093),t(11.23, (18)=0.516, p>.05, or average error incurred across either 
the altitude AA(M=65.81, SD=37.99), M(M=47.70, SD=24.88),t(18)=1.261, p>.05, or 
airspeed AA(M=3.949, SD=1.449), M(M=2.847, SD=1.184),t(18)=1.862, p>.05, metrics 
as indicated in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Average error during Training Block 3 
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A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on a trial by trial analysis also failed to 
reveal any main effects for group or trial, or any interaction between them for altitude  
F(1)= 2.650, p>.05), (Є = .201), (F(3.816, 19)= 1.576, p>.05, (F(3.816, 19)= 0.906, 
p>.05 airspeed F(1)= 0.431 p>.05, (Є = 0.194), F(3.678, 19)=1.970, p>.05, F(3.678, 
19)=0.493,  p>.05, or heading F(1)=3.492, p>.05, Є = .119, F(2.263, 19)= 0.930, p>.05, 
F(2.263, 19)= 0.856, p>.05, despite intermittent indications of such in graphic plots of 
the data shown in figures 17, 18, and 19. As such, these data present no direct evidence of 
consistent error reduction that would otherwise support the claim that significant learning 
had taken place during TB3.  
 
 




Figure 18.  trial by trial airspeed error during training block 3 
Even though there was no group difference observed in the average number of 
times participants were able to reach criterion during their twenty trials, the fact that this 
occurred approximately thirty percent of the time (M= 6.45, SD=6.94 for both groups 
combined) provides indirect evidence that learning actually did occur during TB3 
regardless of whether the trainee had received automation assistance during TB2 or not.  
 
Figure 19.  trial by trial heading error during training block 3 
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Given that criterion achievement is the only performance measure which actually 
captures how well trainees can integrate the three control inputs simultaneously by 
accepting error tradeoffs between individual metrics, it is perhaps the best learning 
indicator available.  It is also worth noting that the 30% criterion observation made in 
TB3 reflects an appreciable increase over the 15% criterion passed by all participants in 
TB1, suggesting that learning may be taking place between training blocks as well as 
within them – particularly since the TB1 and TB3 tasks were of similar difficulty – both 





CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Automation influence at test  
The magnitude of glide slope error incurred by participants from the automation 
assisted group compared to those who trained with full manual control presents 
compelling evidence that learning detriments associated with the automation removal 
effect reported by Clegg and colleagues (Clegg, Benjamin A., et al., 2010) are not 
necessarily limited to the domain of process control, and may (based on effect size) 
degrade training efficiency for unmanned system operators even more severely. 
Considering the nature of the phrase automation “assistance”, the results from these 
studies may initially seem a bit counter intuitive. The popular divide and conquer 
approach to learning complexity, after all, has played a prominent role in learning theory 
since the advent of cognitive psychology in the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson & Lebiere, 
1998, pp. 1-3; Bshouty, 1996; Fu, Lee, Chiang, & Pao, 2001).  
From a meta-cognitive standpoint, however, these findings are not all that 
surprising, particularly in light of more recent literature which has established that 
humans are notoriously overconfident in many aspects of their learning endeavors 
(Joseph, 2009; Koriat & Bjork, 2005; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004; Koriat, 
Ma'ayan, Sheffer, & Bjork, 2006). Trainees who over estimate their level of capability, 
after all, may be inclined to remove themselves from voluntary training programs 
prematurely, thus denying themselves higher performance and retention levels than might 
otherwise be achieved.  
With overconfidence considered in the context of unmanned systems, automation 
assisted trainees may have only engaged themselves to a minimal extent while 
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maintaining an overly optimistic expectation that they were learning as much as possible. 
Others may have simply offloaded responsibility for the control error they incurred to 
imperfect nature of the automation that was supposed to be assisting them in the first 
place – thereby depriving themselves of sensitivity to subtle yet critical relationships 
between control inputs that those who struggled with multi-modal control in the manual 
condition developed a better appreciation for.  
When examining the impact of autonomy on training, however, it is important to 
not only consider the magnitude of its influence on performance, but also nature of how 
that impact manifests itself in light of manipulated variables. While the performance 
decrement observed in the autonomy assisted group was expected commensurate with 
previous findings, it was initially surprising to see the autonomy removal effect achieve 
statistical significance in only one of the three test performance metrics as opposed to 
both of the dependent variables measured by Clegg and colleagues – units of good juice 
produced, and units of spoiled juice produced.  
On closer inspection, however, it is interesting to note which performance 
measures were most influenced by the introduction of automation into the training 
sequence and the nature of that automation itself. When the autopilot was introduced 
during TB2, it consisted of functionality applied only to the control inputs (pitch and 
throttle) which primarily influenced the vertical aspect (or glide slope) of the aircraft’s 
flight path. As such, the autopilot presented a negligible impact on aircraft heading 
during training which most closely relates to the ground track metrics during test.  
The data suggest that by allowing the automation assisted group to focus 
exclusively on the roll axis during TB2, participants were somehow able to avoid 
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excessive error observed in glide slope, and perform on par with the manual group in 
both the approach and final ground track metrics. This equivalent proficiency between 
groups in turning the aircraft, however, appeared to come at a cost in transfer of glide 
slope control to the landing task test. If automation were not to blame for additional error 
in the vertical component of flight control, it is doubtful that such a direct mapping of 
inputs with test data would be evident.  
The LTT trial by trial data indicate that the excess error initially incurred by the   
autonomy assisted group and the beginning of the test phase was reined in a bit over the 
next four trials. Although it is unclear whether the AA participants were able to 
completely catch up to the M group in comprehensive performance, the time it took for 
the AA group to rein in its excess error was comprised of 15-20 minutes of hands on 
control, or “stick time” spread across four or five LTT trials. This “rein in” period 
represents approximately 25% - 30% of the 60 x 1 minute basic maneuver training trials 
– a period which corresponds almost exactly to the length of time that autonomy was 
involved in TB2. This temporal correlation perhaps lends additional (albeit indirect) 
support for the link between automation and performance decrements.  
The specific reason(s) why this effect persists across both the process control and 
unmanned aircraft domain at test remains unclear. With an aircraft as complicated to fly 
as the Predator, one might expect that providing novice trainees with automated 
assistance would bring an exceptionally challenging performance goal within reach. 





Automation influence during training 
While the detrimental impact of autonomy removal appears to be well established 
at test, its influence during training is less clear. Despite the rigor with which “stick time” 
was maintained at a constant level, the lack of any significant group differences 
throughout all three basic maneuver training blocks raises a number of questions about 
how direct and/or immediate the influence of autonomy is manifested. If, for example, 
automation influence was tied directly to motivation or various feedback mechanisms, 
one would logically expect to see an immediate (or nearly so) training performance 
decrement revealed between groups somewhere in the 40 trials that took place just after 
autonomy was introduced. Yet the results show no appreciable difference between groups 
during this period despite concurrent evidence that learning took place during the 
injection of automation into TB2 and after it was removed.  
Automation as a part task training agent   
Considered in isolation, the training data do not provide direct evidence of an 
autonomy removal effect.  If participants had become complacent or overly dependent 
upon autonomy for altitude and airspeed control during TB2, they should have performed 
significantly worse in TB3 when those responsibilities were suddenly handed back to 
them. The data simply fail to show such a difference. What is quite clear, however, is that 
a relative deficiency did manifest itself in a closely related component of the landing task 
as evidenced later by significant differences in glide slope error.  One explanation for this 
perplexing state of affairs can be found in the context of efficiency tradeoffs made 
between Part Task Training (PTT) decomposition and the integration requirements 
imposed by Whole Task Training (WTT).  
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The Part Task Training approach follows a general divide and conquer rubric, 
handling complex learning challenges by breaking them down into component subtasks 
that can be practiced in relative isolation. This allows trainees to develop proficiency in a 
number of basic subtasks before facing the additional (and arguably more complicated) 
challenge of combining and balancing tradeoffs between them in pursuit of higher goals 
(Naylor & Briggs, 1963). The Whole Task Training (WTT) paradigm, by comparison, 
requires trainees to struggle with multiple subtasks simultaneously despite the 
challenging tradeoffs required between subtasks while simultaneously trying to develop 
enabling skills themselves (Naylor & Briggs, 1963; Stammers, 1982; Wightman, 1983; 
Wightman & Lintern, 1985).    
Upon closer review of experimental procedures conducted above, it becomes 
clear that the AA group was never required to integrate all three control inputs in a 
fashion championed by the Whole Task Training (WTT) realm until they entered the 
final training/test phase – landing the aircraft.  The trial by trial LTT data show that once 
the AA participants were given the opportunity to attempt this, they were eventually able 
to rein their excess Glide Slope error when compared to manual participants who were 
required to integrate all three control inputs (throttle, pitch, & roll) during TB2. In this 
sense, automation acted as a separation / isolation agent which enabled PTT to be 
conducted enroute to a WTT objective.  
It is important to make a key distinction here between the process control 
paradigm used by Clegg and colleagues, and PTT/WTT structure used here with the 
Predator STE. In both cases automation was introduced into the training phase of the 
experiment and the removed before test. In the process control experiment, however, the 
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evaluation conditions and performance measures remained consistent between the 
training and test phase. In the composite task used at test in the current experiment, 
trainees were not only faced with a new scenario that required component skills to be 
balanced and integrated in a novel (though arguably familiar) way, but their performance 
was evaluated by different metrics as well.   
 This subtle yet significant difference in experimental design may provide some 
insight as to why the autonomy removal effect was so prominent in the process control 
experiment’s training phase but not here. The trainees in the process control arrangement 
were oriented on an aggregate task that may have induced a relative dependency on 
autonomy which caused an obvious and immediate drop in training performance when 
suddenly removed. The Predator STE experiment, by comparison, was oriented on a 
highly organized integration task at test which required trainees to not only combine their 
newly acquired skills, but balance them with overlapping performance tradeoff 
considerations developed during their previous three training blocks.  
The automation assisted group was spared the requirement to make such tradeoffs 
during TB2 creating a situation which presented no observable decrement in performance 
at the time, but appeared to result in an impoverished mental model of the relationship 
between component skills compared with the manual group. This created a performance 
deficit at test that was surprisingly strong and persistent across multiple trials. The 
durability of this effect essentially kicked the integration can down the road at an 
alarming cost in overall training efficiency. While the participants exposed to automation 
were eventually able to reduce their error rate to one roughly approximating that of the 
45 
 
manual group, it took them 4 additional trials to do so – a cost that any evaluator or 
training manager would be reluctant to accept.   
This delayed onset of this performance degradation also raises concerns regarding 
the potential for automation to mask deep deficits in conceptual understanding during 
component training activities. The sudden appearance of these deficits during more 
complex endeavors with higher task organization is of particular concern for trainers 
trying to prepare operators for future duties in high risk environments where even 
moderate performance decrements can result in the catastrophic loss of innocent lives 
(Massood & Shah, 2011; Mazetti & Schmitt, 2011; Smith, 2011).  
Automation and workload 
Given the part task / whole task implications discussed above, the question 
remains whether underlying principles can be identified for autonomy induced learning 
deficits. Previous work suggests that the injection of an automated module into our 
training regimen may have pulled the AA group out of a desirable difficulty sweet spot 
that is required to develop comprehensive mental models via deep encoding during 
learning (Bainbridge, 1983; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Moray, 1986). 
The notion of desirable difficulty has been considered an important aspect of 
training research and skill acquisition at least as far back as 1956, when it was discovered 
that more skill was often transferred between tasks when a more difficult version was 
presented first rather than the other way around (Day, 1956). The positive influence of 
difficulty was also noted in the recall accuracy of material presented before and after an 
intervening task was injected into a typical study / test process. Participants who were 
required to perform a difficult task in between material presentations recalled more 
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information at test than those afforded an easier intervening task (Bjork & Allen, 1970; 
Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992).  
A general consensus in the literature considers difficult yet attainable tasks to 
often yield the most efficient learning (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981), albeit  
subject to influence and compatibility with established goals (Huber, 1985). Consistent 
improvements in test performance and delayed retention have also been associated with 
the introduction of difficulty during training in both motor and verbal task domains even 
when doing so appears to lower performance during training (Bjork & Bjork, 2006; 
Schmidt & Bjork, 1992).  
Considered in the context of this research foundation and the framework 
presented here, the results suggest that the introduction of automation imposed a 
performance deficit at test by 1) making the training during TB2 too easy for even novice 
participants to develop a comprehensive mental model of aircraft response to various 
control input combinations, and by 2) denying them the experience of managing those 
inputs under challenging conditions that would allow them to perform as well as the 
manual group during landing.  
Alternative explanations 
Motivational issues are often postulated as a cause and/or consequence of automation 
induced complacency, especially in monitoring or process control tasks, which may drive 
systems design toward redesign of feedback as an appropriate mitigation strategy (Moray, 
1986; Norman, D. A., 1990). It has been suggested, for example, that a trainee’s 
perceived shift in locus of control (to the autopilot in this case) may influence their 
motivation to learn, especially in regard to feedback (Noe, 1986). Since trainees in this 
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experiment received feedback on each and every trial they performed, these issues are 
particularly important to consider as influential factors.  
Given the 75 times that participants received end of trial performance feedback, for 
example, it is quite possible that those who perceived an improvement in their 
performance might have become apathetic when unrequested (and perhaps even 
unwanted) “assistance” from the autopilot was thrust upon them in TB2. Given that they 
were specifically told to ignore trial by trial feedback on the two performance 
components that the autopilot was supposed to perform for them (altitude and airspeed 
hold) this indifference prediction seems likely. If particularly perceptive participants 
ignored instructions and monitored the autopilot’s performance anyway, they might have 
even begun to realize that the autopilot actually performed these functions in an imperfect 
fashion. Upon realizing that the autopilot’s assistance might prevent them from ever 
reaching criterion during this training block (which was the case, but participants were 
not explicitly told this) the AA group would have been understandably justified in 
adopting an apathetic attitude and simply giving up on the task.   
Similar arguments have been made in discussion of automation induced complacency 
and other influential factors that may reduce situational awareness of the aircraft 
operator, creating a dreaded “out of the loop” performance decrement in the process 
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber, et al., 2000). Since we did not explicitly measure 
personal attitude, motivation, or situational awareness we had no direct empirical way to 
test this apathy or “out of the loop hypotheses. Indirect analysis of the performance data 
that was collected, however, does not support it.  
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The fact that there no group performance differences were observed after automation 
was introduced in TB2 or after it was removed in TB3 drains any support for the notion 
that a significant change in motivation occurred. Since the number of trials in which 
participants reached criterion in TB3 actually increased compared to previous training 
blocks, it is highly unlikely that motivation to learn decreased after automation was 
introduced or subsequently removed. These results also suggest that the automation 
assisted participants remained aware enough of their situation to keep up with the 
learning rate achieved by the manual group. It follows from the increase in trials reaching 
criterion for both groups during TB3 that motivation and awareness remained intact or 
perhaps even increased slightly after automation was invoked. Anecdotal evidence for 
this was provided via research logs on which experimenters were required to record any 
apparent signs of duress, distraction, or motivational deficits during each trial they 
observed. No behavioral indicators of motivation deficits were noted for either group.  
With regard to relationships that may exist between the autopilot’s influence on 
motivational factors and locus of control, it might have been interesting to examine 
whether user invoked automation could result in different learning patterns than full 
manual control or automatically applied automation as Clegg and colleagues did in the 
orange juice pasteurizer study. The inherent software limitations of the Predator STE 
preclude this type of experimental design, however, because the auto pilot has to be setup 
prior to the beginning of each trial and cannot be adjusted or even turned off until the trial 
ends. Thus, the participants in this experiment had no capacity to toggle the autopilot on 
or off once a trial had started, or even change which control inputs they would be allowed 
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to manage, so the influence of variable activation remains unexplored here and left to 
future research with different simulators.   
There are attentional switching and focus issues to be explored here however, 
particularly as they pertain to the two computer monitors which participants used for 
awareness of the aircraft’s status as indicated in Figure1. Such concerns are of prominent 
relevance under conditions with multiple task loads and variable control requirements 
that are often competing for attentional resources (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010; 
Wickens, et al., 2006). 
During TB1, the left monitor contained all the instrumentation needed to hold the 
aircraft’s heading and altitude steady while reducing airspeed from 67 down to 62 knots. 
This instrumentation consisted of the artificial horizon, current airspeed, attitude 
indicator, vertical speed indicator, and current altitude display as indicated by the red 
dashed arrows in Figure 20. Since heading was supposed to be held constant there was no 
information displayed on the right monitor that contributed directly to this task. During 
training it was often observed that participants would focus almost exclusively on the left 
monitor for the entire trial, switching their focus to the right monitor only at the end to 





Figure 20: Typical left monitor display at the beginning of TB1 trials 
Because performance data was always displayed on the right monitor at the 
completion of each training or landing trial, it is quite possible (if not probable) that 
participants became conditioned during TB1 to focus on the left monitor during simulated 
flight and only use the right monitor at the end of each trial for feedback. The turning 
requirement initiated in TB2, however, presented an advantage of switching attention to 
the right monitor from time to time.  As participants transitioned into this turning 
scenario, they needed to expand their attentional resources to include additional 
instrumentation displayed on the monitor in the form of the numerical heading and rate of 
turn indicators highlighted by red circles in Figure 21. Although the left monitor provided 
trainees with sufficient information to create a gross representation of the aircraft’s 
posture during a turn, the right monitor presented additional information with the 
potential for a refined posture to be ascertained in pursuit of the critical error reduction 




Figure 21: Typical left monitor display during TB2 trials 
   On the left monitor heading is represented numerically while bank angle and turn 
rate are represented graphically in the form of the tilted yellow artificial horizon and thick 
orange slider bar at the bottom of the screen. The right monitor reverses this arrangement 
by adding a numerical component for bank angle and a compass ring for heading as 
indicated in Figure 22. What is so important about this aspect of turn co-ordination is the 
relationship between bank angle and turn rate. Trainees typically struggle to establish and 
maintain the proper turn rate during this task as evidenced by substantial oscillations in 
bank angle, especially when having to control for altitude and airspeed drift at the same 
time. Only those trainees who are able to rapidly but smoothly establish and maintain the 
standard rate of turn (3 degrees per second) throughout the majority of the trial are able to 




Figure 22: Typical right monitor display during TB2 trials 
Since there is no numerical representation of turn rate anywhere in STE’s display, 
trainees are forced to estimate it graphically via extension of the thick yellow bar at the 
bottom of the screen – which provides only a coarse estimation at best. The next best 
input for turn rate estimation is bank angle, but that representation on the left monitor is 
presented in a coarse analog graphic as well. The right monitor, however, presents bank 
angle in a crisp numerical fashion that requires little interpretation. It also presents a 
macro view of heading in a natural graphic that most people are familiar with regardless 
of their aviation experience – the compass rose.  
It has been well established in the perceptual and attention literature that increases in 
task difficulty typically result in a more narrow perceptual focus, while decreased 
difficulty is associated with greater generality of transfer between tasks (Ahissar & 
Hochstein, 1997, 2000; Wickens & Andre, 1990).  Given this background, it is doubtful 
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that the manual group was inclined to glance over to the right monitor for additional 
information while struggling to control pitch, throttle and bank angle control inputs while 
simultaneously monitoring all of the other display items available during TB2.  
The automation assisted group, on the other hand, only needed to monitor those 
display features directly related to the single axis of control (roll/bank angle) for which 
they were responsible. The freedom from multi-task control could have provided the AA 
group with the opportunity to view the additional information available on the right 
monitor and thus enjoy a corresponding reduction in their heading error during TB2. This 
is precisely the kind of automation induced mechanism that has been shown to actually 
increase situational awareness in the performance of complex tasks (Endsley & Kaber, 
1999; Wickens, 2008). It also suggests that some participants in AA group may actually 
have been learning different cues and indirectly practicing different task variations than 
the manual group under Sheridan’s notion of automation influence (Sheridan & 
Parasuraman, 2000; Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005). 
The problem with these hypotheses, however, is that the data simply fail to support 
them. If the AA group had suffered an out of the loop effect, then their heading error 
during TB2 should have been significantly larger than that found for the manual group. If 
they had been able to capitalize on the reduced demand for their attentional resources and 
exploit the additional information on the right monitor, then they should have performed 
significantly better than the manual group in TB2. The fact that no performance 
differences were found between groups during TB2 or TB3 denies support for either of 
these situations. The lack of attentional / situational awareness measurements via eye 
tracking or other devices also precludes the development of any direct empirical 
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determination regarding the bearing of these factors on the results obtained, and serves as 
additional motivation for future research.   
Conclusion and implications 
Taken collectively, the results reported above support the hypothesis that 
autonomy removal effects observed in the process control domain do in fact transfer to 
the motor control arena exemplified by the Predator STE unmanned systems simulator. 
They also exposed a troubling feature of automation induced training deficiency in that 
its deleterious influence was apparently masked during training itself. The most 
parsimonious account of this finding resides in the notion that automation served as a part 
task training agent which interfered with the development of a comprehensive mental 
model during learning that did not manifest itself until the integration of component skills 
was required at test. Additional support for this interpretation comes from a tank gunnery 
study in which automation was invoked in a similar manner to moderate part/whole 
training effects (Marmie & Healy, 1995), albeit in an extended retention format that lies 
beyond the scope of this experiment.  
A theoretical basis for the poor mental model formulation evident at test, but not 
during training, may be examined in terms of the distinction between intrinsic, germane, 
and extraneous cognitive load offered by proponents of Cognitive Load Theory (CLT). 
This theory, fashioned loosely on a brain function analogy that emulates a generator style 
load management paradigm, presents intrinsic load as a basic component of learning 
which differs significantly depending upon the interactivity between various knowledge 
elements (Paas, 1992). Tasks with low interactivity between elements tend to be learned 
serially in a rote memory fashion, while those with high interactivity can actually be 
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understood at a high level, and recorded in the form of various schemas which can be 
processed with varying degrees of automaticity by the learner (Sweller, van Merrienboer, 
& Paas, 1998). Schema construction, which lies at the heart of the theory, benefits most 
from germane load in which understanding of interactivity between elements is 
maximized, and least from extraneous load which generally serves to divert the learner’s 
attention away from it.  
This appreciation for interactivity between training elements fits well with the 
discussion of sensitivity to control mode interaction presented above. It follows from that 
discussion that automation somehow interfered with the understanding that should have 
been derived from direct interactivity experience between control mode “elements” in the 
manual group. This in turn may have deprived the automation group of sufficiently well 
developed schemas that they would need to transfer into a new conceptual model during 
the novel landing task presented at test. Unfortunately, the innovative and logical scaffold 
beneath CLT is still lacking empirical support from dissociations between and direct 
measures of cognitive load variants during training (Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van 
Gerven, 2003). It is hoped that the findings presented here may provide a modicum of 
such support in future evolution of the theory.  
These findings also introduce some important implications for trainers of the 
future – especially those hoping to increase efficiency by providing automated assistance 
to novice trainees in the form of complex task decomposition. Not only was evidence of 
any automation advantage absent during the entire four hour procedure followed here, but 
the substantially detrimental effect observed in the opposite direction was not revealed 
until the very last test phase of training. This not only provides evidence that automation 
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can indeed mask learning deficits in the unmanned systems control regime on par with 
those previously observed in the process control and decision support domains 
(Bainbridge, 1983; Moray, 1986) – it begs the question as to whether similar effects may 
remain hidden in other learning endeavors as well.   
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of all, however, is the implication that some 
trainees tend to offload responsibility for the error they incur as an artifact of imperfect 
automation, even when it is activated at a minimal level as observed here during the 20 
TB2 trials. Such an effect could transfer detrimental influences beyond component skill 
acquisition into higher forms of integrated reasoning, such as those required for ethical 
and moral decision making. The appalling nature of people’s obedience to authority 
observed in Stanley Milgram’s infamous shock experiments, for example, is widely 
considered to represent a human tendency to offload responsibility for undesirable 
consequence to others (Blass, 2004). Perhaps this tendency would be evident (if not 
amplified) in unmanned system operators involved in situations where autonomous 
agents of some sort were “wearing” the lab coat instead of humans. Despite Hollywood 
hype that surrounds various movies projecting robots and automated systems that have 
somehow evolved to acquire lethal capabilities, additional caution may be in order 
regarding just how much of accountability we allow ourselves to offload to machines. 
With a heavy caveat that these studies only present undergraduate student data from a 
single university, these findings support a warning flag with a least a modicum of 




Future work: toward a neuro-adaptive training workload sweet spot 
Despite the negative connotation of the findings described above, the tremendous 
potential for automation to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of learning is 
indisputable. From the very advent of computer science, Ed Feigenbaum proved that an 
expert system comprised of rule base extracted from multiple doctors’ diagnostic 
experience could consistently outperform junior physicians and occasionally even those 
with the most impressive track record and profession background (Russell, Norvig, & 
Artificial Intelligence, 1995, pp. 23-24). For those learning how to diagnose symptoms 
associate complex problems, this notion of encapsulated experience cannot escape 
consideration as a powerful pedagogical tool. Even those exposing serious concerns for 
automation’s impact on transportation safety cannot help but provide a balanced 
perspective on its value (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008). From 
an applied tactical/rescue research perspective, automation is not only an important factor 
for unmanned systems design – it represents a critical component of its very essence as a 
reliable extension of human capability.  
Some in the human factors realm have defined automation as “the execution by a 
machine agent (usually a computer) of a function that was previously carried out by a 
human  (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 231). Blitch, however, rejected this limited, 
anthro-centric perspective in a vigorous plea for leaders within the military, emergency 
services, and space exploration communities to embrace the powerful potential of 
mechanical design freedom in pursuit of advanced robotic capabilities that could not only 
replicate human performance, but actually exceed it (Blitch & Maurer, 1996; Krotkov & 
Blitch, 1999; Weisbin et al., 1999). This work originally championed the deployment of 
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“micro” robots (loosely defined as having a cross section well below a human form 
factor) for penetration of denied areas on the battlefield, in narrow space habitat conduits 
and rock fissures potentially hiding UV-phobic microbes on Mars, and twisted void 
spaces in collapsed rubble. Later efforts, however, focused on development of Adaptive 
Robotic Manipulators (A.R.Ms) that might combine the amazing extension capacity of 
cephalopod tentacles and other muscular hydrostats with the hyper redundant nature of 
elephant trunks to create a family of robot appendages with a wrapping capability for 
compliant object manipulation, dynamic target capture, and other tasks of interest to 
those working in these challenging operational domains. Unlike the cockpit derivations of 
Fitts’ list that focused on the liberation of cognitive resources from tedium in pursuit of 
greater efficiency and human convenience, the evolution of imperatives for Tactical 
Mobile Robot (TMR) control anticipated automation as a critical technology which 
actually enabled control of complicated systems such as a multi-limbed collection of 
squid tentacles that evolutionary models of human cognition were incapable of (Blitch, 
2000).  
Considering such “inhuman factors” in a training environment where robot 
operators must learn how to control hyper-redundant, multi-limbed manipulators that 
exceed human capacities derived from anthropomorphic evolution, the injection of 
automation into training is unavoidable. This inevitability and the alternative hypotheses 
discussed heretofore dictate the need for continued research into identification and 
mitigation strategies for whatever deleterious influence automation may occasionally 
exert on trainees in this challenging and important arena. In addition to the pursuit of 
higher statistical power, extensive workload measurement must be conducted enroute to a 
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more comprehensive understanding of the underlying principles involved. Given the well 
established tradeoff between immediate skill acquisition and retention durability (Healy, 
Ericsson, & Bourne Jr, 1999; Healy, Wohldmann, Parker, & Bourne, 2005), retention of 
the skills acquired here should also be assessed over various duration intervals.   
Returning to the notion of desirable difficulty and cognitive load, it seems that the 
most compelling issue to address at this point is how to promote the formulation of 
accurate schemas integrate them into comprehensive cognitive models while avoiding 
automation induced pitfalls enroute to more skill and expertise. Although Ericsson’s 
seminal work on expertise acquisition is often cited for its numerical threshold 
concerning ten thousand hours of practice, few recognize the emphasis placed on 
deliberate focus attached to that practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). 
Fewer still demonstrate an appreciation for the nature of what sort of practice can be 
considered “deliberate” in the first place (Gladwell, 2008).  In pursuit of the sweet spot of 
desirable difficulty described early, it seems logical that automation introduced to 
trainees for pedagogical purposes will need to adapt to the student’s workload level in 
order to pursue optimal learning(Van Merriënboer, Kester, & Paas, 2006).   
The need for adaptive automation has been well established and examined across 
a number of environmental settings, including the process control (Moray, Inagaki, & 
Itoh, 2000) and aviation (Parasuraman, 1992) domains which were of particular concern 
here. Literature regarding adaptive automation involved in novice training activity is 
scarce, however, and often deals more with resource allocation activities than direct 
control of unmanned platforms (Kaber & Endsley, 2004).  
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Given that automation induced learning deficits that are masked during training 
can manifest in potentially dangerous ways downstream, adaptive modules for enhanced 
learning will most likely need to monitor inputs other than those based on performance in 
order to promote efficient schema formulation without negative side effects. Recent 
development of neuro-imaging techniques suitable for monitoring workload in addition to 
task performance can provide an appreciable degree of optimism in addressing this 
challenging objective (Berka et al., 2004; Berka et al., 2007; Freeman, Mikulka, Prinzel, 
& Scerbo, 1999). In any case, there is ample evidence here for caution to be applied when 
automation is injected into the learning environment. In a world where the mystical 
nature of artificial intelligence has enticed some to turn over classrooms to robot teachers 
(Agostini, Celaya Llover, Torras, & Wörgötter, 2008; Carey & Markoff, 2010), the stakes 
could not be higher for our children’s children.  
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